Dating the State: The Moral Hazards of Winning Gay Rights by Franke, Katherine M.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2012 
Dating the State: The Moral Hazards of Winning Gay Rights 
Katherine M. Franke 
Columbia Law School, kfranke@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, European Law Commons, Law and Gender 
Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Katherine M. Franke, Dating the State: The Moral Hazards of Winning Gay Rights, COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW REVIEW, VOL. 44, P. 1, 2012 (2012). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1773 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 










DATING THE STATE: THE MORAL HAZARDS OF 
















Columbia Human Rights Law Review 
Vol. 44, No. 1 
Fall 2012 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2186595
 
COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 44, No. 1 Fall 2012 
 












































Directors of Staff 
and Alumni 
Relations 
Natasha Hwangpo  
(Staff Development) 





































Executive SJLM Editor 
Gabriella Barbosa 
 














COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 
























































































 STAFF EDITORS 
BOARD OF ADVISORS 
 
DATING THE STATE: THE MORAL HAZARDS 
OF WINNING GAY RIGHTS 
Katherine Franke* 
On August 1, 2009, a masked man dressed in black carrying 
an automatic weapon stormed into Beit Pazi in Tel Aviv, the home of 
the Aguda, the National Association of GLBT in Israel.1 He opened 
fire on a group of gay and lesbian teenagers who were meeting in the 
basement for “Bar-Noar,” or “Youth Bar,” killing two people and 
wounding at least ten others.2 This terrible act of violence attracted 
immediate national and international attention and condemnation. 
President Simon Peres declared the next day:  
[T]he shocking murder carried out in Tel Aviv 
yesterday against youths and young people is a 
murder which a civilized and enlightened nation 
cannot accept. . . . Murder and hatred are the two 
most serious crimes in society. The police must exert 
great efforts in order to catch the despicable 
murderer, and the entire nation must unite in 
condemning this abominable act.3  
                                                                                                             
*  Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law and Director of the 
Center for Gender and Sexuality Law, Columbia Law School, email: 
kfranke@law.columbia.edu. Particular thanks to Lila Abu-Lughod, Lauren 
Berlant, Mary Anne Case, Ariela Dubler, Aeyal Gross, Tayyab Mahmud, Joseph 
Massad, Afsaneh Najmabadi, Amr Shalakany, Neferti Tadiar, Kendall Thomas, 
Erez Aloni, Janlori Goldman, audiences at the American University in Cairo, 
Seattle University Law School, Boston University Law School, Duke Law School, 
and Columbia University for thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this 
essay, and to Megan Crowley for her able research assistance. © 2012 by 
Katherine Franke. All rights reserved. 
1.  Murder in the Bar-Noar, Aguda (Aug. 2, 2010), 
http://glbt.org.il/en/aguda/articles.php?articleID= 
1572; Two Killed in Shooting at Tel Aviv Gay Center, Haaretz (Aug. 1, 2009, 11:14 
PM), http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1104506.html. 
2.  Murder in the Bar-Noar, supra note 1; Two Killed in Shooting at Tel 
Aviv Gay Center, supra note 1. 
3.  Roni Sofer, Netanyahu: Israel a Country of Tolerance, Ynetnews.com 
(Aug. 2, 2009, 10:56 AM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
3755571,00.html (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu added: “We are a democratic 
country, a country of tolerance, a law-abiding state, and we will honor 
every person regardless of his or her beliefs.”4 When the Prime 
Minister visited the Aguda’s building several days later, he remarked, 
“This is not just a blow to the gay-lesbian community. This is a blow 
to all Israeli youth and Israeli society.”5 President Peres echoed these 
remarks at a rally honoring the murdered gay teens: “The gunshots 
that hit the gay community earlier this week hit us all. As people. As 
Jews. As Israelis.”6 
These remarks, while laudable for their strong condemnation 
of violence against gay and lesbian people, signal something quite 
interesting about the relationship between homosexuality, the state 
of Israel, the Jewish people, and the idea of a modern, democratic, 
and tolerant state. Israel’s top political leaders did more than express 
concern about an act of private violence against members of the 
nation’s sexual minority; rather the way they rendered the Aguda 
shooting both patriotized its victims and homosexualized Jews and 
Israel.7 
This essay turns to several diverse sites of global  
politics—Israel, Romania, Poland, Iran, and the United States—to 
illuminate the centrality and manipulation of sexuality and sexual 
rights in struggles for and against the civilizing mission that lies at 
the heart of key aspects of globalization. I began this essay with the 
discussion of Israel not to single it out, but to illustrate a larger, more 
widespread phenomenon. It is worth tracing why, how, and to what 
                                                                                                             
4.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
5.  TA Gay Attack Bears Marks of Terrorism, Jerusalem Post (Aug. 6,  
2009, 10:06 AM), http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=150999 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
6.  Attila Somfalvi, Peres at Gay Support Rally: Bullets Hit Us All, 
Ynetnews.com (Aug. 8, 2009, 10:41 PM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/ 
0,7340,L-3758881,00.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7.  Israeli politicians, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
activists, and the media overwhelmingly framed the Tel Aviv shooting as a hate 
crime, not an act of terrorism, despite the fact that the shooter wore a black ski 
mask and sprayed a group of Israelis with an automatic weapon. Surely not every 
act of violence that takes place in the state of Israel, whether it is a shooting, a car 
accident, or a barroom brawl, is understood as an attack on Israel and the Jewish 
people. Some acts of violence are considered random and their meanings do not 
exceed their mere violence, while others are labeled acts of terror (a frequent 
occurrence in Israel). This one was immediately considered a hate crime—a 
violation of the human rights of gay, indeed all, Israelis. Unpacking the 
categorization of crime as hate crime or terrorism is a worthy project but one for 
another venue. 
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effect a state’s posture with respect to the rights of “its” homosexuals 
has become an effective foreign policy tool, often when negotiating 
things that have little or nothing to do with homosexuality.8 
I aim in this discussion to intervene in an ongoing 
conversation among scholars of international law and politics that 
has cleaved into two rather unfriendly camps. On the one side  
are human rights groups and activists who seek to secure human 
rights protections for subordinated, oppressed, tortured, and 
murdered sexual minorities around the globe. They have worked hard 
to bring lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people within 
the protective infrastructure of the well-organized human rights 
communities. On the other side is a group, perhaps most 
provocatively represented by Joseph Massad in Re-Orienting Desire: 
The Gay International and the Arab World,9 that derides the work of 
LGBT human rights actors and organizations for a kind of missionary 
zeal to universalize Western, sexualized identities that have little or 
no fit with the ways in which sexuality—or, for that matter, 
identity—takes form in settings outside the West. “Following in the 
footsteps of the white Western women’s movement, which . . . sought 
                                                                                                             
8.  The use of “gay rights [as] . . . a public-relations tool” has been termed 
“pinkwashing” by critics. Sarah Schulman, Israel and “Pinkwashing,” N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 23, 2011, at A31 (quoting Aeyal Gross, a law professor at Tel Aviv 
University) (internal quotation marks omitted). As I have noted elsewhere: “[T]he 
pinkwashing critique applies to all states, not just Israel. In the United States 
there are many of us who have expressed concern that the Obama administration 
is using its good gay rights record (repealing ‘don’t ask/don’t tell,’ backing away 
from defending the Defense of Marriage Act, and endorsing marriage equality 
rights for same-sex couples, for example) to deflect attention from its otherwise 
objectionable policies (aggressive deportation of undocumented people, use of 
drones to execute civilians, and failure to prosecute anyone or any entity in 
connection with the 2008 financial crisis for example). As some states expand 
their laws protecting the rights of LGBT people, pinkwashing has become an 
effective tool to portray a progressive reputation when their other policies relating 
to national security, immigration, income inequality, and militarism are anything 
but progressive.” Katherine Franke, The Greater Context of the Pinkwashing 
Debate, Tikkun Mag. (July 3, 2012), http://www.tikkun.org/nextgen/the-greater-
context-of-the-pinkwashing-debate. 
9.  Joseph Massad, Re-Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the 
Arab World, 14 Pub. Culture 361 (2002); see also Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist 
Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times, at xxiv (2007) (discussing “forms 
of queer secularity that attenuate constructions of Muslim sexuality” and noting 
the “emergence of a global political economy of queer sexualities”); Sonia Katyal, 
Exporting Identity, 14 Yale J.L. & Feminism 97, 100–01 (2002) (“[T]he changing 
social meanings surrounding gay or lesbian sexual identities raise deeply complex 
questions that are often ignored by scholars and activists in the name of 
globalizing gay civil rights.”). 
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to universalize its issues through imposing its own colonial feminism 
on . . . women’s movements in the non-Western world—a situation 
that led to major schisms from the outset—the gay movement has 
adopted a similar missionary role,” wrote Massad in Public Culture in 
2002.10 Not surprisingly, Massad received some pushback from the 
persons and entities he identified as imperialist missionaries who 
have sought to redeem their good names and good work.11 In the 
middle of these two polarized perspectives lie a few activists and 
scholars who have charted a middle course, acknowledging the ever-
present risk of imperial effects, if not aims, when undertaking rights 
work in an international milieu, while at the same time recognizing 
the important and positive work that rights-based advocacy can bring 
about.12 For this last group, as for Gayatri Spivak, rights are 
something we “cannot not want,”13 yet we proceed with them 
cognizant of the complex effects their use entails. 
The present essay carries a brief for neither side of this 
debate (though I will confess sentiments that strive toward the 
middle course). Rather, it seeks to introduce an analysis none of the 
disputants have acknowledged: To focus this discussion on the 
relationship between LGBT human rights non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) in the metropole and the potentially colonial 
subjects they seek to aid misses a third and vastly important actor in 
this theater—the state. In hugely interesting ways, states have come 
to see that their political power, their legitimacy, indeed their 
standing as global citizens, are bound up with how they recognize and 
then treat “their” gay citizens. A careful analysis of the role of human 
rights mechanisms and institutions in the expansion of human sexual 
freedom requires that we recognize and account for the manner in 
                                                                                                             
10.  Massad, supra note 9, at 361. 
11.  See, e.g., Scott Long, The Trials of Culture: Sex and Security in Egypt, 
Middle E. Rep., Winter 2004, at 12, 18 (“What must be resisted is the political 
presumption that all interchange is conquest.”). 
12.  See, e.g., Aeyal Gross, Queer Theory and International Human Rights 
Law: Does Each Person Have a Sexual Orientation?, 101 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 
129, 132 (2007) (asking how human rights violations can be addressed “without 
imposing a Western model of sexuality” but also without ignoring the realities of 
globalization); Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 179, 181, 185 
(2002) (analyzing “prevailing cultural prejudices that inform the interpretation of 
comparative scholarship on Chinese Law” and examining the “ethics of 
comparison”); Amr Shalakany, On a Certain Queer Discomfort with Orientalism, 
101 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 125, 128 (2007) (“[W]e might see in U.S. gay-identity 
discourse some benefits for the Egyptian bottom.”). 
13.  Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Outside in the Teaching Machine 51 
(2009) (emphasis added). 
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which NGOs working in this area, along with the populations they 
seek to aid, often find their work and their interests taken up and 
deployed by state actors for purposes that well exceed the articulated 
aims of something called “human rights.” The Israeli example I 
opened with is but one of the ways in which sexuality bears a curious 
relationship to global citizenship, politics, and governance. 
Illuminating this complex dynamic reveals some patterns: 
Modern states are expected to recognize a sexual minority within the 
national body and grant that minority rights-based protections. Pre-
modern states do not. Once recognized as modern, the state’s 
treatment of homosexuals offers cover for other sorts of human rights 
shortcomings. So long as a state treats its homosexuals well, the 
international community will look the other way when it comes to a 
range of other human rights abuses. 
I. ISRAEL 
When and how did homophobic violence acquire such 
important meaning in Israel, such that the president and prime 
minister were expected to, and did, embody the role of national victim 
before domestic and international audiences immediately after the 
shooting? Why then and not in 2005 when an ultra-Orthodox man 
stabbed and wounded three participants in the Jerusalem gay pride 
parade,14 or the following year when right-wing activists called for 
violent protests against the WorldPride procession in Jerusalem?15 
The answer lies in significant part in efforts by the Israeli 
government to rebrand itself in a self-conscious and well-funded 
campaign termed alternately “Brand Israel” and “beyond the 
conflict.”16 In 2006, in large measure in response to its military 
                                                                                                             
14. See Greg Myre, Israel: 3 Stabbed At Jerusalem Gay Parade, N.Y. 
Times, July 1, 2005, at A9. 
15.  See Neta Sela, Holy War Against Pride Parade, Ynetnews.com (Oct. 30, 
2006, 2:48 AM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3321178,00.html; 
Efrat Weiss, Baruch Marzel: Pride Parade Will Lead to Violence, Ynetnews.com 
(Oct. 18, 2006, 5:48 PM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
3316718,00.html. 
16.  See David Suissa, Opening Israel, Virtual Jerusalem (Sept. 8, 2011, 
9:26 AM), http://www.virtualjerusalem.com/blogs.php?Itemid=4693 (describing  
efforts of the Israeli Foreign Ministry to improve Israel’s image by  
focusing attention on areas “beyond the conflict’” with the Palestinians as part of 
an initiative titled “Brand Israel”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Uriel Heilman, The Difficult Chore of Getting Israel’s Message Across, B’nai B’rith 
Mag., Summer 2009, at 20, 24, available at http://www.urielheilman.com/ 
0601hasbara.html (discussing Israel’s rebranding efforts, including the Israeli 
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incursion into Lebanon, Israel found its international “brand 
reputation” slipping to a new low. Simon Anholt, who publishes the 
influential annual Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index,17 observed 
that in 2006: 
Israel’s brand was by a considerable margin the most 
negative we had ever measured in the NBI [Nation 
Brands Index], and came bottom of the ranking on 
almost every question. . . . In response to one of the 
questions in [the governance] section of the survey, 
‘how strongly do you agree with the statement that 
this country behaves responsibly in the areas of 
international peace and security?’, Israel scored 
lowest of all the 36 countries in the NBI.18 
When the Palestinians elected a Hamas-majority government 
in January of 2006, the Israelis sensed that they had a public 
relations opening. “After decades of battling to win foreign support for 
its two-fisted policies against Arab foes, Israel is trying a new 
approach with a campaign aimed at creating a less warlike and more 
welcoming national image,” wrote a Reuters reporter covering the 
meeting of then-Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni with executives from 
the British public relations firm Saatchi & Saatchi.19 Livni expressed 
the view that the protracted conflict with the Palestinians was 
sapping Israel’s international legitimacy. “When the word ‘Israel’ is 
said outside its borders, we want it to invoke not fighting or soldiers, 
but a place that is desirable to visit and invest in, a place that 
preserves democratic ideals while struggling to exist,” Livni told the 
British advertising executives who had agreed to work on the Israeli 
re-branding effort for free.20 
Thus the Foreign Ministry, concerned that the international 
community held an unfairly negative view of Israel, launched an 
                                                                                                             
Foreign Ministry’s May 2006 effort to bring a group of American entertainment 
reporters to Israel in order to visit trendy Tel Aviv nightclubs, Israeli rock stars, 
and gay and lesbian rights groups). 
17.  The Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index, GfK Custom Research 
North America, http://www.gfkamerica.com/practice_areas/roper_pam/nbi_index/ 
index.en.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
18.  Simon Anholt, Places: Identity, Image and Reputation 58 (2010). 
19.  Dan Williams, Don’t Mention the War—Israel Seeks Image Makeover, 
Reuters, Oct. 26, 2006, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2006/10/26/uk-
mideast-israel-image-idUKL2611919120061026. 
20.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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extensive public relations campaign “to make people like us.”21 “The 
idea here is to have a major branding campaign in America and 
Europe,” Gidon Meir, deputy director-general for public affairs at  
the Foreign Ministry, told the Jewish Daily Forward in 2005 as the 
campaign was getting underway.22 The government, along  
with branding experts from the private sector, set out to “re-brand” 
the country’s image to appear “relevant and modern” instead of 
militaristic and religious.23 According to the Jewish Daily Forward, 
“[d]irectors of Israel’s three most powerful ministries agreed on a new 
plan to improve the country’s image abroad—by downplaying religion 
and avoiding any discussion of the conflict with the Palestinians.”24 
The state of Israel is not alone in its turn to public relations 
experts as part of a larger “nation-branding” policy. Scholars have 
described the marketing of state reputation as a form of “soft power” 
whereby the state aims to “persuade and attract followers through 
the attractiveness of its culture, political ideals and policies.”25 In this 
regard, virtually every country has devoted considerable public funds 
to international branding campaigns designed to advance economic 
and diplomatic objectives.26 
                                                                                                             
21.  Livni “hired a whole host of public relations firms who have  
conducted focus groups and used other mass marketing tools to figure out  
how to reinvent Israel in a manner that will make people like us.” Caroline Glick,  
Truth in Advertising, Jerusalem Post (Nov. 3, 2006, 3:53 PM), 
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id=40071. This campaign 
has specifically included a pitch to make Israel appear more friendly based on its 
treatment of gay men and lesbians. See id.   
22.  Nathaniel Popper, Israel Aims to Improve Its Public Image, Jewish 
Daily Forward (Oct. 14, 2005), http://www.forward.com/articles/2070/ (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. 
25.  Evan H. Potter, Branding Canada: Projecting Canada’s Soft Power 
Through Public Diplomacy, at i (2009). 
26.  See, e.g., Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign 
Policy in the Gulf War 131–48 (W. Lance Bennett & David L. Paletz eds., 1994) 
(examining the role of the media in the development of U.S. foreign policy in the 
Gulf War); Jozef Bátora, Public Diplomacy Between Home and Abroad: Norway 
and Canada, 1 Hague J. Dipl. 53, 54 (2006) (observing the importance of nation-
branding as a basis for arguing for a “more sophisticated understanding of public 
diplomacy”); James E. Grunig, Public Relations and International Affairs: Effects, 
Ethics and Responsibility, 47 J. Int’l Aff. 137 (1993) (discussing the ethical issues 
involved in international public relations); Alice Kendrick & Jami A. Fullerton, 
Advertising as Public Diplomacy: Attitude Change Among International 
Audiences, 44 J. Advertising Res. 297 (2004) (assessing the effectiveness of an 
advertising campaign run by the United States in the Middle East and Asia from 
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The re-brand Israel campaign took a decidedly “pink turn” in 
2006. The Israeli Ministry of Tourism launched a beef-cakey website 
that promoted gay (largely gay male) tourism in Israel,27 and enlisted 
the assistance of several NGOs (and GNGOs28). Israeli diplomats 
were explicit about the role for gay and lesbian rights in this strategy. 
“We’ve long recognized the economic potential of the gay community. 
The gay tourist is a quality tourist, who spends money and sets 
trends,” Pini Shani, a Tourism Ministry official, told the media after 
Tel Aviv was elected a top gay destination in 2012.29 “There’s also no 
doubt that a tourist who’s had a positive experience here is of PR 
value. If he leaves satisfied, he becomes an Israeli ambassador of good 
will.”30 Caroline Glick further noted in her article A Gay Old Time: 
“Ministry officials view gay culture as the entryway to the liberal 
culture because . . . gay culture is the culture that creates ‘a buzz.’”31 
To advance the pink tourism project, the Tel Aviv-Yafo Tourism 
Association established the Tel Aviv Gay Vibe campaign in 2010, 
offering gay travelers “discounted travel and flights, plus free city 
                                                                                                             
October 2002 to January 2003); Philip Kotler & David Gertner, Country as Brand, 
Product, and Beyond: A Place Marketing and Brand Management Perspective, 9 J. 
Brand Mgmt. 249 (2002) (exploring whether a country can be a brand); Peter van 
Ham, Branding Territory: Inside the Wonderful Worlds of PR and IR Theory, 31 
Millennium 249 (2002) (exploring how and why nation branding has become 
important); Peter van Ham, The Rise of the Brand State: The Postmodern Politics 
of Image and Reputation, 80 Foreign Aff. 2 (2001) (arguing that nation branding is 
contributing to the pacification of Europe); Beata Ociepka & Marta Ryniejska, 
Public Diplomacy and EU Enlargement: The Case of Poland (Neth. Inst. of Int’l 
Relations Clingendael, Discussion Paper in Diplomacy No. 99, 2005) (describing 
Polish public diplomacy efforts during Poland’s accession to the European Union 
(EU)). 
27.  See Gay Israel, http://tourism.glbt.org.il (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) 
(noting that on the website you can find “everything you need to know about gay 
Israel: pictures, tourist sites, accommodation, attractions, gay night life and 
entertainment,” among other things). 
28.  GNGO, or governmental NGO, is a term used to refer to a NGO created 
by a governmental entity to do work in support of, or in furtherance of, the state’s 
interests and aims. 
29.  Aron Heller, Tel Aviv Emerges as Top Gay Tourist  
Destination, Huffington Post (Jan. 24, 2012, 08:46 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/24/tel-aviv-gay-travel-
destinations_n_1227888.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
30.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
31.  Caroline Glick, A Gay Old Time, Jewish Press (Nov. 8, 2006), 
http://www.jewishpressads.com/pageroute.do/19838/ (quoting David Saranga, 
former Consul for Media and Public Affairs at the Consulate General of Israel in 
New York and former Deputy Spokesman for the Israeli Foreign Ministry). 
2012] Dating the State 9 
tours and restaurant vouchers,”32 and launched a website,33 a Twitter 
account,34 and a smartphone application.35 Additionally, Israeli 
consulates across the United States and Europe frequently sponsor 
gay-friendly activities, such as the Tel Aviv Gay Vibe Float in 
Chicago’s Gay Pride Parade.36 
What distinguished Israel’s branding strategy was not the 
degree to which it was chasing gay tourist dollars by explicitly selling 
itself as a “gay mecca” (an ironic term to be sure).37 Berlin is  
                                                                                                             
32.  Tel Aviv to Rebrand Itself as Gay Destination, PinkNews (July 22, 2010, 
4:18 PM), http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2010/07/22/tel-aviv-to-rebrand-itself-as-gay-
destination/. 
 33.  Tel Aviv Gay Vibe, http://telavivgayvibe.atraf.com (last visited Oct.  
30, 2012).  
 34.   Tel Aviv Gay Vibe, Twitter, http://twitter.com/TelAvivGayVibe (last 
updated Sept. 15, 2011).  
 35.   See Tel Aviv Gay Vibe, iTunes App Store, http://itunes.apple.com/us/ 
app/tel-aviv-gay-vibe/id433636568?mt=8 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).  
36.  The Consulate General of Israel to the Midwest promoted the Tel Aviv 
Gay Vibe Float through Facebook, Israel in Chicago, Tel Aviv Gay Vibe Float @ 
Chicago Gay Pride Parade 2011, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/ 
events/105208666236631/ (last modified June 26, 2011), and through its Twitter 
account, Israel in Chicago, Come to “Tel Aviv Gay Vibe float @ Chicago Gay Pride 
Parade 2010” Sunday, June 27 from 12:00 pm to 10:00 pm, Twitter (June 16, 
2011, 12:10 PM), http://twitter.com/#!/IsraelinChicago/status/ 
16328567787. There are many other examples of national and local  
Israeli government entities enlisting well-known gay people in the project  
of public diplomacy. See, for example, the U.S. tour of Assi Azar, a  
famous openly-gay television star, Events, Out in Israel Month, 
http://www.outinisraelmonth.com/#!events (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) (promoting 
several screenings of Assi Azar’s documentary film as part of the Out in  
Israel Month Campaign in November 2011, organized by the Consulate General  
of Israel to New England); Gal Uchovsky, Left and Gay in Israel, Jerusalem  
Post (Nov. 2, 2011, 10:59 PM), http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-
EdContributors/Article.aspx?id=244186 (describing Assi Azar’s tour as “the first 
US leg of this grand scheme” organized by the Israeli Foreign Ministry, which has 
also included “an exhibition of gay art in London and Manchester with works from 
some great Israeli talents”). 
37.  Examples of the frequent reference to Tel Aviv as a “gay  
mecca” include Aviv Benedix, Tel Aviv, Israel’s Gay Mecca, Invites Gay  
Travelers to Come and Visit, Israel Gay News (Dec. 7, 2010), 
http://israelgaynews.blogspot.com/2010/12/by-aviv-benedix-israels-second-
largest.html (calling Tel Aviv the “gay Mecca” of Israel and noting that Lonely 
Planet and Out Magazine have referred to Tel Aviv as “a kind of San Francisco of 
the Middle East” and “the gay capital of the Middle East,” respectively) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Mayaan Lubell, Tel Aviv Reveling in Gay Tourism 
Boom, Reuters, Jan. 24, 2012, available athttp://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2012/01/24/us-israel-tel-aviv-gay-idUSTRE80N12O20120124 (“Leon Avigad, 
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well known for doing so as well, to its great economic advantage. In 
fact, Out Now Consulting, the gay public relations firm that designed 
the “MyGayBerlin” campaign38 was hired by the Israelis to assess the 
feasibility of branding Tel Aviv as an international gay tourist 
destination.39 Rather, what differentiated the role of gays in the 
Israeli branding campaign was the position it played in a larger 
national political agenda, one that exceeded mere niche marketing to 
gay tourists. Israeli’s public embrace of gay rights figured at the core 
of a project to distract attention from, if not to cancel out, the growing 
international condemnation of Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians. 
To this end, the Ministry of Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs 
has solicited applications from Israeli citizens who would like to serve 
as “public diplomats,” traveling abroad (at the state’s expense) 
spreading the good word about Israel. The announcement makes 
clear that the program “is primarily interested in receiving 
applications from people representing the diverse faces of Israeli 
society, including . . . representatives of the gay community.”40 
Israel’s promotion of its pro-gay policies has, over time, 
operated in two registers. First, as laid out above, there was the 
deliberate campaign to improve Israel’s international “brand 
perception” by highlighting Tel Aviv as a hot and hunky gay tourist 
destination. Over time, however, the emphasis has shifted from being 
a project of the Tourism Ministry to one used by the Foreign Minister 
as a tool of foreign relations. To great effect, Israel has sought to 
stake out a moral high ground in comparison with its enemies by 
referring to how well it treats its gays. Israeli government officials 
and their private sector advocates have seen a strategic advantage in 
comparing Israel’s tolerance of gay people with intolerance toward 
gays in neighboring Arab countries. Naomi Klein, in an interview, 
                                                                                                             
owner of the gay-friendly Brown hotel, said Tel Aviv has become a ‘gay Mecca’ and 
is enjoying a tremendous tourist boom in recent years.”). 
38.  Out Now Consulting’s Facebook page states: “Out Now has worked with 
German National Tourist Office and Berlin Tourism Marketing for several years 
to credentialize these destinations with lesbian and gay travelers.” Out Now, Out 
Now Global: Gay Market Leaders—Berlin Tourism Marketing, Facebook (Oct. 29, 
2008, 12:02 PM), http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=32620247091. 
39.  Press Release, Out Now Consulting, Think You Know All About Gay 
Welcoming Tourism Destinations? Think Again: The First-Ever Market Study 
into Middle East Gay Travel Unveiled by Out Now at WTM (Oct. 7, 2009), 
available at http://www.webwire.com/ViewPressRel.asp?aId=105143. 
40.  Asa Winstanley, In New Pinkwashing Recruitment Campaign, Israel 
Offers Free Travel for Propaganda Services, Electronic Intifada (Nov. 24, 2011, 
10:43 PM), http://electronicintifada.net/blog/asa-winstanley/new-pinkwashing-
recruitment-campaign-israel-offers-free-travel-propaganda. 
2012] Dating the State 11 
laid it out plain and simple: “[T]he state of Israel has an open 
strategy of enlisting gay and lesbian rights and feminism into the 
conflict, pitting Hamas’s fundamentalism against Israel’s supposed 
enlightened liberalism as another justification for collective 
punishment of Palestinians.”41 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu’s speech to the U.S. Congress in May 2011 said it best: “In 
a region where women are stoned, gays are hanged, Christians are 
persecuted, Israel stands out. It is different.”42 
As the outcry about the Israeli Occupation of Palestine grew 
louder, Israeli voices responded: Look how well we treat our gays! The 
complex significance of this official and public use of Israeli 
homosexuals can only be fully appreciated when considered in light of 
the Israeli security agency Shin Bet’s policy begun in 1967 to “turn” 
Palestinian homosexuals into informants through blackmail and 
other dirty tactics.43 As recently as May 2012, Shin Bet officers 
detained a gay Palestinian man visiting East Jerusalem to see a 
medical specialist and told him that if he didn’t inform the Shin Bet 
“when he ‘hears about a demonstration, about people, where they’re 
going, who’s got a mind to protest, who helps kids who throw stones, 
who’s religious, who throws stones at soldiers,’” he would “‘see what 
kind of problems [the officers would] make for [him] with the 
Palestinian Authority.’”44 Thus, the Ministry of Public Diplomacy and 
                                                                                                             
41.  Cecilie Surasky, Naomi Klein Shows You Can Boycott Israel  
Without Cutting Off Dialogue Over Palestine, Alternet (Aug. 31, 2009), 
http://www.alternet.org/story/142341/. 
42.  Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Speech to U.S. Congress (May 
24, 2011), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+ 
Israeli+leaders/2011/Speech_PM_Netanyahu_US_Congress_24-May-2011.htm. 
43.  As a result, gay men have gained a reputation in Palestinian society for 
being collaborators or snitches, given the widespread belief that gay people are 
vulnerable to blackmail by the Israelis. This reputation is not entirely unearned, 
given the “success” of Shin Bet’s tactics. See Jason Ritchie, Queer Checkpoints: 
Sexuality, Survival, and the Paradoxes of Sovereignty in Israel-Palestine 118 
(Jan. 14, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champagne), available at http://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/18233 
(noting that the Shin Bet identifies homosexuals as one of the most fruitful 
sources for its network of Palestinian collaborators). This fact is vital to 
understanding how homophobia in Palestine derives not only from a kind of 
sexual revulsion we are familiar with elsewhere, but also from particularly local 
political dynamics.  
44.  Amira Hass, Shin Bet Inquiry: Did the Israeli Slip His Gay Palestinian 
Lover Into the Country Illegally?, Haaretz (May 28, 2012, 2:04 AM), 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/shin-bet-inquiry-did-the-israeli-slip-his-
gay-palestinian-lover-into-the-country-illegally.premium-1.432857. 
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Diaspora Affairs’ use of gay public diplomats is, in important 
respects, the friendly flip side of that of Shin Bet. 
Concerned that the international community was wavering in 
its hard line stance toward Iran’s growing nuclear capability, in 2009, 
Israel allocated roughly two million dollars to a new campaign to 
discredit Iran by specifically highlighting its mistreatment of lesbians 
and gay men.45 The Israeli Foreign Ministry confessed that the new 
public relations campaign “aims to appeal to people who are less 
concerned with Iran’s nuclear aspirations and more fearful of its 
human rights abuses and mistreatment of minorities, including the 
gay and lesbian community.”46 David Saranga, former Consul for 
Media and Public Affairs at the Consulate General of Israel in New 
York and former Deputy Spokesman for the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 
put it clearly: 
Instead of wasting time attempting to persuade them 
[i.e., liberal audiences in the United States and 
Europe] that I am right, in contradiction of their 
worldview, it is better to try to speak to them through 
the concepts and values that they understand and 
appreciate. For instance, presenting the attitude 
towards the gay community in Israel and the equality 
it enjoys often cracks the blind wall of criticism which 
liberal audiences in the United States may present.47 
The Israeli Supreme Court joined the issue in September  
of 2010. It held that the City of Jerusalem had engaged in 
impermissible discrimination in its ongoing refusal to fund the city’s 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community center, Open 
House.48 Year after year, the City had refused funding requests from 
Open House, and Justice Isaac Amit, writing for the Court, ruled 
that: 
The history of the relationship between the parties 
reveals that the appellant’s hand reaching out for 
support has met time and time again with the miserly 
                                                                                                             
45.  Barak Ravid, Israel Recruits Gay Community in PR Campaign Against 
Iran, Haaretz (Apr. 20, 2009, 9:46 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/ 
spages/1079589.html. 
46.  Id. 
47.  Uri Leventher, The Diplomat Who Tweeted, Globes: Israel’s Business 
Arena (Oct. 14, 2009, 6:51 PM), http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview. 
asp?did=1000505339 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
48.  File No. 343/09 Supreme Court (Jer), Jerusalem Open House for Pride 
& Tolerance v. City of Jerusalem (Sept. 14, 2010), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) (Isr.). 
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hand of the municipality . . . . We cannot but express 
hope that the municipality will not behave stingily 
again and that the sides can ‘shake hands’ without 
further involving the court.49 
Justice Amit declared that equal and respectful treatment of 
the gay community was one of the criteria for a democratic state, 
noting that this is what separates Israel from “most of the Mideast 
states near and far, in which members of the gay community are 
persecuted by the government and society . . . .”50 He then mentioned 
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s 2007 speech at Columbia 
University in which Ahmadinejad claimed that there were no 
homosexuals in Iran.51 This statement by the Iranian president 
served as evidence, in Justice Amit’s view, of Israel’s comparative 
tolerance, modernity, and morality.52 Whether or not this language is 
officially a part of the new campaign to use gay rights to whip up 
support both domestically and abroad for a military strike against 
Iran, the Israeli Supreme Court is certainly pulling an oar in this 
project. 
Aeyal Gross, a law professor at Tel Aviv University as well as 
a sharp critic of Israeli politics generally and LGBT politics in Israel 
specifically, wrote about the role of the gay community in the Brand 
Israel campaign: 
LGBT rights are used as a fig leaf, and the larger the 
area that needs to be hidden, the larger the fig leaf 
must be. Although conservative and especially 
religious politicians remain fiercely homophobic, this 
is partially counterbalanced—even in years when a 
conservative government has been in power—by the 
new homonationalism and the important role gay 
rights plays in burnishing Israel’s liberal image.53 
Other NGOs closely allied with the Israeli re-branding effort, 
such as StandWithUs, a pro-Israeli advocacy organization based in 
Los Angeles,54 have explicitly pursued a strategy of responding to 
                                                                                                             
49.  Id. at ¶ 86. 
50.  Id. at ¶ 55. 
51.  Id. 
52.  See id. (describing Israel as “liberal” and “democratic”). 
53.  Aeyal Gross, Israeli GLBT Politics between Queerness  
and Homonationalism, Bully Bloggers (July 3, 2010), 
http://bullybloggers.wordpress.com/2010/07/03/israeli-glbt-politics-between-
queerness-and-homonationalism/. 
54.  StandWithUs is “an international, non-profit organization that 
promotes a better understanding of Israel, through examination of diverse issues.” 
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criticism of Operation Cast Lead, a three-week military campaign 
Israel began in Gaza in December of 2008,55 by emphasizing how well 
lesbian and gay people are treated in Israel. “We decided to improve 
Israel’s image through the gay community in Israel . . . .” said an 
official with StandWithUs to the Jerusalem Post.56  
We’re hoping to show that Israel is a liberal country, a 
multicultural, pluralistic country . . . . That is a side of 
Israel we are very proud of and that we think should 
be shown around the world. . . . As far as a lot of 
people are concerned, Israel is Gaza and the West 
Bank and tanks, and they don’t see the beautiful 
culture and the liberal side.57  
Other bloggers similarly saw an opportunity to blunt international 
criticism of Operation Cast Lead by pointing to Hamas’s intolerance 
toward gay men as a justification for the Israeli military action.58 
Back in the United States, StandWithUs circulated a flyer on college 
campuses in which it compared Israeli, Egyptian, Jordanian, 
Palestinian, Iranian, Lebanese, and other Middle Eastern states’ 
policies on “sexual freedom” and concludes that Israel is the “only 
country in the Middle East that supports gay rights.”59 
                                                                                                             
Stacey Maltin, International Pride Comes to Tel Aviv, Ynetnews.com (June 13, 
2009, 9:00 AM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3730396,00.html. 
55.  Operation Cast Lead, otherwise known as “the Gaza War,” was a three-
week Israeli military offensive begun in late 2008 aimed at stopping rocket fire 
from Gaza into Israeli territory. A U.N. report issued after the end of the war 
charged both Israel and the Palestinians with war crimes and possible crimes 
against humanity. U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, Human 
Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the United 
Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, Human Rights Council, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009) (by Richard Goldstone et al.). 
56.  Mel Bezalel, Gay Pride Being Used to Promote Israel Abroad,  
Jerusalem Post (June 7, 2009, 10:13 PM), http://www.jpost.com/Israel/ 
Article.aspx?id=144736 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
57.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
58.  Paula Brooks, What About the Gaza Gays?, Lez Get Real: A Gay  
Girl’s View on the World (Jan. 4, 2009, 3:21 PM),  http://lezgetreal.wordpress.com/ 
2009/01/04/what-about-the-gaza-gays/. 
59.  Gay Rights in the Middle East, StandWithUs, 
http://www.standwithus.com/pdfs/flyers/gay_rights.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
StandWithUs was by no means the first to use this strategy. “As the second 
Palestinian Intifada erupted in the autumn of 2000, a curious and persistent 
argument began being employed by supporters of the Israeli state. . . . [M]any of 
them rather macho young men who never identified themselves as gay and who 
almost certainly never lived in an Arab or Muslim country, would stand up and 
decry the lack of gay rights in the Palestinian Territories compared to their view 
2012] Dating the State 15 
The timing of the pink turn in Israel’s management of its 
international reputation is noteworthy. Convincing the world that 
Israel is a gay haven in the otherwise homophobic Middle East began 
to figure centrally in the marketing of Israel in the aftermath of 
Operation Cast Lead. Military tactics used by both the Israelis and 
the Palestinians in the Gaza War were subject to international 
criticism; however, the Israelis received particularly harsh 
condemnation from the international human rights community for 
the targeting of civilians and the use of disproportionate force.60 
In the spring of 2011, as the Free Gaza Flotilla was preparing 
to sail to the Gaza Strip with the intent of highlighting the Israeli 
blockade of Gaza, a slick, well-produced video began to circulate on 
Facebook and elsewhere on the Internet, purportedly made by 
“Marc”, a “gay rights activist.”61 He reported the “hurtful” and 
“heartbreaking” experience of being told by flotilla organizers that 
“the participation of [his] LGBT network would not be possible since 
it would not be in the overall interest of the flotilla.”62 He then 
explained to the camera how the organizers of the flotilla had close 
ties to Hamas and highlighted Hamas’s violent hatred of women and 
homosexuals.63 He ended with a plea to those who care about human 
rights: “Be careful who you get in bed with. If you hook up with the 
wrong group you might wake up next to Hamas.”64 The video got 
much play, including promotion by the Israeli Government Press 
Office on Twitter.65 It was later discovered that “Marc” was an Israeli 
                                                                                                             
of the enlightened policies of Israel.” Blair Kuntz, “Queer” As A Tool Of Colonial 
Oppression: The Case Of Israel/Palestine, ZNet (Aug. 13, 2006), 
http://www.zcommunications.org/queer-as-a-tool-of-colonial-oppression-the-case-
of-israel-palestine-by-blair-kuntz. 
60.  The U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict issued a 
controversial report on the force used by both sides in Operation Cast Lead. See 
U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, supra note 55. 
61.  marc3pax, Who You Get in Bed With—Human Rights, Gay Rights, 
YouTube (June 23, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vhmBbGFJleU. 
 62.   Id.    
 63.   Id.  
64.  Id. 
65.   See Anti-Flotilla Video Fraud Linked to PM Netanyahu’s Office, Official 
Israeli Hasbara Agents, Max Blumenthal (June 24, 2011), 
http://maxblumenthal.com/2011/06/anti-flotilla-video-fraud-has-links-to-pm-
netanyahus-office-official-government-hasbara-agents/ [hereinafter Blumenthal] 
(“Earlier today, the Israeli Government Press Office promoted the apparent hoax 
video on Twitter.”); Benjamin Doherty, Israeli Actor in Anti-Gaza Flotilla 
Pinkwashing Video Identified, Electronic Intifada (June 25, 2011, 6:03 PM), 
http://electronicintifada.net/blog/benjamin-doherty/israeli-actor-anti-gaza-flotilla-
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actor hired to create the video as a way of discrediting the flotilla’s 
aims.66 According to journalist Max Blumenthal, the Government 
Press Office’s tweet was a re-tweet from a Netanyahu aide who 
seemed to have opened a Twitter account for the sole purpose of 
promoting the video.67 
The fake anti-flotilla video well illustrates why Israel’s use of 
gays in its re-branding campaign has been termed by critics as 
“pinkwashing.”68 Israel has effectively used the “gay issue” to advance 
a larger political aim of proving that Palestinians are too backwards, 
uncivilized, and unmodern to have their own state. The campaign to 
create gay solidarity with Israel around the globe has also, often 
unwittingly, drawn LGBT communities outside the Middle East into 
collusion with the Israeli state’s larger public relations project.69 
Israel’s so-called pinkwashing of its treatment of the 
Palestinians as a tool to gain international support for its larger 
                                                                                                             
pinkwashing-video-identified (discussing the “YouTube video condemning the 
Gaza Freedom Flotilla for alleged homophobia, that was tweeted by the Israeli 
Government Press Office”); see also Ethan Bronner, Setting Sail on Gaza’s Sea of 
Spin, N.Y. Times, July 2, 2011, at SR3 (“Israeli officials . . . had promoted the clip 
on Twitter and Facebook . . . .”); Catrina Stewart, The Hoax Video Blog and the 
Plot to Smear a Gaza Aid Mission, Independent (June 29, 2011), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/the-hoax-video-blog-and-
the-plot-to-smear-a-gaza-aid-mission-2304030.html (describing the “heavy 
promotion by Israeli government bodies on Facebook and Twitter”).         
66.  Bronner, supra note 65 (stating that the “video was exposed as a fake,” 
posted by an Israeli actor, and noting that Israeli “officials had long used the 
talking point that Hamas and other Islamist groups were intolerant of 
homosexuality”); Doherty, supra note 65 (revealing Marc’s true identity as Omer 
Gershon, a figure “who is relatively well-known in the Israeli gay scene”); 
Stewart, supra note 65 (noting that bloggers, after becoming suspicious of the 
video’s “slick production and heavy promotion by Israeli government bodies,” 
exposed Marc as an Israeli actor named Omer Gershon). 
67.  Blumenthal, supra note 65. 
68.  See Sarah Schulman, supra note 8 (noting that the “global gay 
movement against the Israeli occupation” has named Israel’s tactics 
“‘pinkwashing’: a deliberate strategy to conceal the continuing violations of 
Palestinians’ human rights behind an image of modernity”); see also Gross, supra 
note 53 (criticizing the Israeli pinkwashing campaign as an effort to mask other 
human rights abuses occurring regularly within Israel’s borders). 
69.  Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG) is one  
recent example thereof. Katherine Franke, PFLAG Holds Israeli  
Pinkwashing Event, Huffington Post (Feb. 22, 2012, 3:21 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/katherine-franke/pflag-israel-
pinkwashing_b_1290935.html (describing an event with Anat Avissar from Aguda 
on February 22, 2012 held at PFLAG headquarters and co-sponsored by the 
Israeli Embassy). 
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foreign policy aims demands careful analysis. The criticism of Israel 
embodied in the term pinkwashing does not deny the fact that gay 
men and lesbians enjoy a wide range of civil and other rights in 
Israel. They do.70 Nor does the term deny that sexual minorities 
struggle in Arab societies. They do.71 Rather, the claim is that 
                                                                                                             
70.  Though, in Israel, as in other places where LGBT rights have gained 
traction, those rights were hard-won and need constant defense. As Erez Aloni, an 
Israeli queer legal scholar, reminded me: “Israel is a highly heteronormative and 
patriarchal state. It is also the case that the movement toward gay rights was 
achieved despite the strong resistance of the government—achievements were 
made mainly by the courts or the attorney general. What’s more, many parental 
rights are banned for same-sex couples; [sic] and there is not even civil 
marriage—not to mention same-sex marriage, or inter-religious marriage by the 
state.” E-mail from Erez Aloni, Fellow, Ctr. for Reproduct. Rights, Columbia Law 
Sch., to author (Feb. 27, 2012, 3:22 PM EST) (on file with author). To be sure, 
homophobia and transphobia are to be found throughout Israeli and Palestinian 
society. See, e.g., Jason Koutsoukis, Homophobia in Israel Still High but Declining 
Slowly, Says Survey, Sydney Morning Herald (Aug. 7, 2009), 
http://www.smh.com.au/world/homophobia-in-israel-still-high-but-declining-
slowly-says-survey-20090806-ebkb.html (stating that in a 2009 poll by Haaretz, 
following the Aguda attack, 46% of 498 people viewed homosexuality as a 
“perversion,” while 42% disagreed); Ilan Lior, Civil Patrol “Army” Formed to 
Stamp Out Homophobic Attacks in TA Park, Haaretz (Feb. 18, 2012, 1:07 AM), 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/civil-patrol-army-formed-to-stamp-out-
homophobic-attacks-in-ta-park-1.409398 (noting two attacks against gay 
individuals in December 2011 and January 2012 near a gay communal center in 
Tel Aviv). The increasingly powerful role that the ultra-Orthodox wing  
(the Haredim) of Israeli society plays in shaping official governmental policy  
and public opinion more generally draws into question the claim that there  
is widespread support for gay rights across Israeli society. See, e.g., Ethan 
Bronner & Isabel Kershner, Israelis Facing a Seismic Rift Over Role of  
Women, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 2012, at A1 (describing the tension between  
the ultra-Orthodox Haredim and the views of other Israelis regarding  
women); The Takeaway: Israel’s Secular and Moderate Majority Struggling with 
Ultra-Orthodox Minority (Pub. Radio Int’l radio broadcast Jan. 16, 2012), 
available at http://www.pri.org/stories/politics-society/religion/israel-s-secular-
and-moderate-majority-struggling-with-ultra-orthodox-minority-7965.html 
(describing the tension between the ultra-Orthodox and more moderate sects of 
Judaism on women). Similarly, the rise of Hamas in Palestinian society has been 
accompanied by a greater intolerance of homosexuality. See, e.g., Press Release, 
Int’l Gay & Lesbian Human Rights Comm’n, Palestinian Territories: IGLHRC 
Supports Free Expression for ASWAT (Mar. 26, 2007), http://www.iglhrc.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/article/pressroom/pressrelease/415.html (noting that ASWAT, a 
Palestinian lesbian organization in Israel, received threats from Islamic leaders 
describing the organization as a “fatal cancer”). 
71.  In Palestine, the oppression of LGBT people takes place as a cultural, 
not legal, matter. Palestinian “law” does not criminalize same-sex sex. The 
Palestinian Legislative Council has not adopted a criminal sodomy law. Thus, in 
the West Bank, where the Jordanian Penal Code is still applied, there is no legal 
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comparisons of this sort are irrelevant. The status of gay people in 
Israel is beside the point insofar as fundamental human rights are 
understood to be universal and not subject to zero-sum calculations: 
Israel’s illegal occupation of Palestine cannot be somehow justified or 
excused by its purportedly tolerant treatment of some sectors of its 
own population. So too, many LGBT Palestinians bristle when the 
Israeli government purports to speak on their behalf and look after 
their interests, driving a wedge between their gay-ness and their 
Palestinian-ness. Israel expresses an interest in their welfare only so 
long as their interests are framed as gay. To the extent that they 
identify as Palestinian, Israel’s helping hand cruelly curls into a fist. 
Indeed, that helping hand is more symbolic than real, since gay 
Palestinian asylum seekers cannot seek refuge in Israel,72 nor can 
most gay Palestinians enjoy the hot gay nightlife of Tel Aviv due to 
the severe limitations placed on their movement by the laws of 
occupation.73 
II. IRAN 
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit to Columbia 
University in September of 2007 sharpened my attention to this 
queer (and by this I mean odd or curious) role of gay rights in larger 
state projects. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was invited 
to give a speech at Columbia University against a backdrop of two 
parallel U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; charges that Iran had 
been covertly supplying arms to Shi’a militias in Iraq; intense 
criticism by the U.S. government of Iran’s efforts to build nuclear 
                                                                                                             
criminal sanction for same-sex sex, as the Jordanians repealed their sodomy law 
in 1951, well before the United States (2003) or the Israelis (1988) did so. Ritchie, 
supra note 43, at 114. In Gaza, where law from the British mandate is still 
applied, there is a law criminalizing sex between men, thus tracing the legal 
sanction of homosexuality in Gaza to colonial, not native, influences. Id. 
Unfortunately, the important work done by LGBT activists in Arab settings is 
often ignored when Arab societies are portrayed as more homophobic than others. 
Al Qaws, Aswat, and Palestinian Queers for Boycott, Divestment and Sanction 
are doing great work in Palestine, as are Helem and Meem in Lebanon, and Kifkif 
in Morocco. ALWAAN, Bint el Nas, and other websites also provide important 
resources to LGBT people in the Arab world. 
72.  Michael Kagan & Anat Ben-Dor, Nowhere To Run: Gay  
Palestinian Asylum-Seekers in Israel 20–22 (2008), available at 
http://www.law.tau.ac.il/Heb/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/Nowhere.pdf. 
73.  Jason Ritchie’s dissertation offers a nuanced and thoughtful study of 
the paradoxes of belonging and disenfranchisement experienced by Palestinian 
queers. Ritchie, supra note 43. 
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weapons; and ongoing campaigns of highly inflammatory anti-US 
rhetoric by the Iranian political leadership and, simultaneously, 
highly inflammatory anti-Iranian rhetoric by U.S. political 
leadership. This invitation was highly controversial—anti-Iranian 
forces arguing that President Ahmadinejad should not be given a 
forum in the United States, and others arguing that free speech and 
open democracy principles instruct that we should hear from those 
whose ideas we find most abhorrent. Still others, though admittedly a 
minority in the university community, felt that President 
Ahmadinejad represented an articulate, though at times extreme, 
counterpoint to U.S. imperialism in the Middle East and Western 
Asia. Notably, the Dean of Columbia Law School felt moved to take 
sides in this debate and issued a press release the day before 
President Ahmadinejad arrived at Columbia expressing anticipatory 
condemnation of the Iranian president’s remarks.74 To my knowledge, 
this was the first and only time that the law school’s Dean has seen it 
appropriate to issue a formal denouncement of any individual—head 
of state or otherwise—invited to speak at the university. 
President Ahmadinejad’s speech would surely gain national 
attention given his views on U.S. involvement in Southwest Asia, his 
insistence on the duplicity underlying the Bush Administration’s 
nuclear proliferation policies, and, of course, his comments about 
Israel and the Holocaust.75 Yet the significance of the Ahmadinejad 
speech and the controversy it triggered has to be understood in local 
context. In the last several years, a number of Columbia faculty 
members who study the Middle East—and have taken positions that 
express some sympathy for the situation of the Palestinians—have 
been aggressively attacked by organizations in the United States 
                                                                                                             
74.  Press Release, David M. Schizer, Dean & Lucy G. Moses Professor of 
Law, Columbia Law Sch., Statement by David M. Schizer Re: SIPA Invitation to  
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Sept. 23, 2007), http://www.law.columbia.edu/ 
media_inquiries/news_events/2007/september07/deans_statement. 
75.  See, e.g., Letter from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to “the 
American People,” (Nov. 29, 2006), available at http://edition.cnn.com/2006/ 
WORLD/meast/11/29/ahmadinejad.letter/ (accusing the Bush Administration of 
foreign policy based on “coercion, force, and injustice,” with reference to the 
invasion of Iraq and U.S. support for Israel, and stating that “legitimacy, power 
and influence of a government do not emanate from its arsenals of . . . nuclear 
weapons”); Iranian Leader Denies Holocaust, BBC News (Dec. 14, 2005, 1:50 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4527142.stm (describing Ahmadinejad’s 
denial of the Holocaust and anti-Israel rhetoric as well as denunciation of his 
statements by Israel, Germany, and the EU). 
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charging them with being anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli.76 These 
activities have included efforts to intervene in the tenure cases of two 
faculty members.77 
When President Ahmadinejad arrived, he was “introduced” by 
Columbia University’s President Lee Bollinger. President Bollinger’s 
direct address to President Ahmadinejad included statements such 
as, “Mr. President, you exhibit all the signs of a petty and cruel 
dictator.”78 Bollinger criticized the Iranian president’s pursuit of 
nuclear weapons; highlighted the mistreatment of women and 
homosexuals in Iran; cited Ahmadinejad’s denial of the Holocaust as 
evidence that the Iranian president was either “brazenly provocative 
or astonishingly uneducated”; and noted as fact Iran’s role in 
supplying arms to the militias in Iraq—thereby taking sides in a 
highly contested war and making an unsubstantiated claim of Iran’s 
involvement in a proxy war in Iraq floated by the U.S. government.79 
Bollinger closed with the charge: “I doubt that you will have the 
intellectual courage to answer these questions.”80 
President Ahmadinejad responded by voicing criticisms of 
U.S. policy in the Middle East and Western Asia in tones and in 
terms rarely heard in the United States. He pointed out the hypocrisy 
of the United States’ efforts to limit the rights of other nations  
to nuclear weapons when it regularly violates the nuclear arms  
                                                                                                             
76.  See, e.g., Karen W. Arenson, Fracas Erupts Over Book on Mideast by a 
Barnard Professor Seeking Tenure, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 2007, at B1 (describing 
the controversial tenure bid of a Barnard anthropology professor, Nadia Abu El-
Haj, whose scholarship received criticism for perceived anti-Israel remarks); 
Jennifer Senior, Columbia’s Own Middle East War, N.Y. Mag. (May 21, 2005), 
http://nymag.com/nymetro/urban/education/features/10868/ (discussing Columbia 
Unbecoming, a 2004 documentary accusing Arab professors of academic 
intimidation). 
77.  Richard Byrne & Robin Wilson, Palestinian-American Scholar at 
Columbia U. Gets 2nd Chance at Tenure, The Chron. of Higher Educ. (May 27, 
2008), http://chronicle.com/article/Palestinian-American-Scholar/835. 
 78.   Helene Cooper, At Columbia University, Ahmadinejad of Iran Parries 
and Puzzles, N.Y. Times (Sept. 25, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/25/ 
world/americas/25iht-ahmedinejad.1.7626558.html?pagewanted=all (internal 
quotation marks omitted).    
79.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing President Bollinger’s 
statements on Iran’s role in Iraq); Annie Karni, Bollinger Stuns Ahmadinejad 
With Blunt Rebuke, N.Y. Sun (Sept. 25, 2007), http://www.nysun.com/new-
york/bollinger-stuns-ahmadinejad-with-blunt-rebuke/63300/ (describing President 
Bollinger’s statements regarding Ahmadinejad’s views on nuclear weapons, 
women, homosexuals, and the Holocaust). 
80.  Cooper, supra note 78. 
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non-proliferation treaty itself,81 and asked why the Palestinian people 
should be shouldered with paying for the historical atrocity of the 
Holocaust when this genocide was committed by Europeans. He 
asked: “[W]hy is it that the Palestinian people are paying the price of 
an event they had nothing to do with?”82 In response to a question 
from a student in the audience about why women were denied human 
rights in Iran, which included a condemnation of the execution of 
young men on account of their presumed homosexuality, 
Ahmadinejad replied that “[w]omen in Iran enjoy the highest levels of 
freedom,” and then asserted: “In Iran, we don’t have homosexuals, 
like in your country. . . . In Iran, we do not have this phenomenon. I 
don’t know who’s told you that we have it.”83 He then reminded the 
audience that in the United States, the state frequently executes 
individuals, not only gay people but many others.84 
Surprisingly enough, despite ample coverage of President 
Ahmadinejad’s visit to Columbia, the parts of the story that got the 
most attention were his remarks relating to women and homosexuals 
in Iran. As one would expect, domestic gay rights groups issued press 
releases the next day denouncing Ahmadinejad’s denial of 
homosexuality in Iran, noting that without question there are men 
who have sex with men in Iran and they are treated very harshly by 
the Iranian government.85 What was most remarkable from my 
                                                                                                             
 81.   See President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Keynote Address at Columbia 
University World Leaders Forum (Sept. 24, 2007), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/09/24/AR2007092401042.html (“If you have created the 
fifth generation of atomic bombs and are testing them already, what position are 
you in to question the peaceful purposes of other people who want nuclear 
power?”).   
82.  “[W]e need to still question whether the Palestinian people should be 
paying for it or not. After all, it happened in Europe. The Palestinian people had 
no role to play in it. So why is it that the Palestinian people are paying the  
price of an event they had nothing to do with?” Id. 
83.  Id. 
84.  See id. (“Don’t you have capital punishment in the United States? You 
do, too.”). 
85.  See, e.g., Press Release, Int’l Gay & Lesbian Human Rights  
Comm’n, Iran: IGLHRC Deplores Denial of Iranian Homosexuals by  
President Ahmadinejad (Sept. 34, 2007), http://www.iglhrc.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/article/pressroom/pressrelease/471.html (denouncing President 
Ahmadinejad’s denial of the presence of sexual minorities in Iran); Press  
Release, Columbia Law Sch. Sexuality & Gend. Law Clinic, Sexuality and  
Gender Law Clinic Denounces Anti-Gay Remarks by Iranian President  
(Sept. 26, 2007),  http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_ 
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perspective, however, was how conservative U.S. politicians and 
commentators highlighted sexism and homophobia in Iran as a 
justification for the denunciation of the Iranian president and as 
reinforcement of the widely held view that Iranian culture was 
particularly intolerant and primitive compared to Western modernity 
and cosmopolitanism.86 Never mind that the U.S. government, 
particularly the administration in place during President 
Ahmadinejad’s visit, was vulnerable to charges of sexism and 
homophobia as well.87 
That gender and sexuality emerged as the most salient 
aspects of President Ahmadinejad’s speech at Columbia is interesting 
not only because of how conservative U.S. politicians showed 
themselves to be deeply hypocritical on these issues when it so served 
their interests. Perhaps more importantly, the use of the rights of 
women and gay people as a device by which the United States 
asserted its moral superiority to Iran echoed similar uses of gender 
and sexuality in struggles for the West to assert its dominance over 
less “civilized” or “modern” peoples. Conversely, resistance to human 
rights norms that both construct and then protect a certain type of 
gendered and sexualized citizenship have been deployed outside the 
West in post-colonial and other contexts as a way of turning back 
                                                                                                             
events/2007/september07/Iran_GLBT (condemning the remarks made by 
President Ahmadinejad at the World Leaders Forum at Columbia University). 
86.  For example, on the show On the Record w/ Greta Van Susteren, the 
following exchange took place between Van Susteren and former Republican 
Congressman Newt Gingrich: 
GINGRICH: Well, I mean—you and I—I think that treating an 
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passing there were fewer homosexuals in Iran.  
VAN SUSTEREN: Does he kill them?  
GINGRICH: They execute them. I’m just saying nobody got up 
and said, [h]ow you can have somebody here who denies the 
Holocaust, executes homosexuals, arrests students, tortures 
and kills journalists . . . .  
On the Record w/ Greta Van Susteren: Newt Gingrich’s Take on Ahmadinejad 
(Fox News television broadcast Sept. 24, 2007), available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,297973,00.html. 
87.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed’n of America, Inc., George W. Bush’s 
War On Women: A Chronology (2003) (outlining actions taken by former 
President Bush that indicate a steady pursuit to eliminate reproductive freedom); 
Barbara Morrill, A Surgeon General Who Will “Cure” Gays?, Daily Kos (June 1, 
2007, 9:07 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2007/06/01/341697/-A-Surgeon-
General-Who-Will-Cure-Gays- (concerning former President Bush’s decision to 
nominate a Surgeon General who had co-founded a church that “ministers to 
people who no longer wish to be gay or lesbian”). 
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Western hegemony and drumming up forms of nationalism.88 The 
nation comes to acquire both a gender and a sexual orientation along 
the way. 
Here we see the role of human rights law—particularly rights 
securing equality for gay men and lesbians—in the expansion of neo-
liberalism and its fellow traveler, capitalism, in less economically 
developed precincts of the world. Revulsion toward gay men gets 
articulated as the most visible trope deployed by political leadership 
seeking to hold on to local control and governance, while tolerance 
toward homosexuality is demanded of those nations that seek 
membership in international economic and political communities. In 
the following sections I aim to illustrate these points through 
struggles for political and economic power in Romania and Poland 
and then will circle back to President Ahmadinejad’s visit to 
Columbia University and the Israeli pinkwashing campaign. I will 
conclude with reflections on the ethical predicament for LGBT human 
rights advocates posed by the complex relationship between rights, 
nationalism, and global citizenship. 
III. ROMANIA AND POLAND 
Human rights norms provide as their justification and their 
source a set of universal and generalizable claims about the moral 
worth of all persons that requires the recognition of the inherent 
dignity and equality of all members of the human family, thereby 
entitling each of us to a set of inalienable rights which any 
government must respect as a condition of its legitimacy.89 In the 
post-World War II era an adherence to human rights has become 
among the most important criteria by which a nation might prove 
                                                                                                             
 88.   “[S]tate efforts to eradicate the traces of empire and to resurrect an 
authentic post-colonial nation have produced sexual subjects that serve as a . . . 
reminder of a demonized colonial past and absence.” Katherine Franke, Sexual 
Tensions of Post-Empire, 33 Stud. L. Pol. & Soc’y 63, 64 (2004). “[A] set of 
homosexual social and legal subjects have been created by the . . . government, 
and once so formed and disciplined, ‘human rights’ rides into the rescue to liberate 
them from social and legal opprobrium. . . . [T]he assistance of the international 
human rights establishment has further reinforced post-colonial nationalist 
rhetoric that located individual rights as a Western norm that threatens to 
undermine authentic . . . culture.” Id. at 65.   
89.  See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 
1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reasons and conscience and 
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”). 
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itself to be civilized and modern.90 Inclusion in various institutions 
that embody modern global citizenship, such as the United Nations, 
the International Monetary Fund, NATO, and regional trade 
organizations, have come to require from applicants that they 
recognize a form of “individualized humanity” in their own citizens, 
and that those citizens possess certain inalienable rights by virtue of 
that humanity. 
For example, the European rules that define whether a 
country is eligible to join the European Union (EU), commonly called 
the Copenhagen Criteria, set forth the following requirements: 
Membership requires that the candidate country has 
achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and, protection of minorities, the existence of a 
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the Union.91 
Accession states—those states that seek admission to the EU—are 
asked to undertake two important reform efforts to qualify for 
admission: One having to do with human rights and the other having 
to do with open markets.92 However, in order to commence 
negotiations with a state seeking membership, the EU insists only 
that the accession state have made progress on the human rights and 
rule of law front.93 These norms are given relative importance over 
the values of open markets, privatization, and fiscal and monetary 
stability.94 
Romania’s effort to secure membership in the EU provides an 
interesting example of how admission to modern economic society 
turns on the differentiation between civilized, rights respecting 
Europe and the non-rights respecting states to its east and south. 
Under this differentiation, Europe is economically disciplined, global, 
and modern, whereas its other is more primitive, tribal or local, 
communitarian, and economically antiquated. Romania’s campaign to 
join the EU started in 1993 with its membership in the Council of 
Europe and culminated in its full EU membership in 2007. It offers a 
                                                                                                             
90.  See, e.g., Peter Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of Law 121 
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91.  Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council (June 21–22, 
1993). 
92.  Id. 
93.  Id. 
94.  Id. 
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useful example of the essential, but in many ways bankrupt, role of 
human rights law—particularly the rights of sexual minorities—in 
the evolution of a state’s “credentialization” as global citizen. 
Romania has had a shocking modern history of human rights 
violations, from Nicolae Ceausescu’s rule through the post-
Communist era.95 The criminal treatment of homosexuality, the 
invasion of women’s bodies in the name of the nation, and 
discrimination against Roma, were among the most extreme forms of 
state-sponsored rights-abridging behavior.96 In 1968, the socialist 
Romanian government enacted Article 200, which criminalized sexual 
acts between persons of the same sex in any setting—expanding into 
the private domain a law that had previously criminalized only such 
acts that created a “public scandal.”97 Article 200 greatly increased 
the penalties for homosexuality, mandating sentences of one to five 
years.98 This new law supplemented Ceausescu’s pro-natalist decrees 
that compelled women to undergo periodic and compulsory 
gynecological examinations and severely punished abortions.99 In 
1986, Ceausescu declared: “[T]he fetus is the socialist property of the 
whole society. Giving birth is a patriotic duty . . . . Those who refuse 
to have children are deserters . . . .”100 To a regime that predicated its 
authority on its surveillance of every detail of existence, there was no 
                                                                                                             
95.  See Tom Gallagher, Romania After Ceausescu: The Politics of 
Intolerance (1995) (examining how officials have abused nationalism in post-1989 
Romania to deflect criticism for human rights violations); see also Human Rights 
Watch, Struggling for Ethnic Identity: Ethnic Hungarians in Post-Ceausescu 
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96.  See, e.g., U.S. Helsinki Watch Comm., Violations of the Helsinki 
Accords, Romania: A Report Prepared for the Helsinki Review Conference 39, 45 
(1986) (reporting state discrimination and persecution against ethnic minorities 
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in Romania: Reversing the Ceausescu Legacy, 22 Stud. Fam. Plan. 231, 231–34 
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reproductive health, family planning, and sex education” in the post-Communist 
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97.  Ingrid Baciu, et al., Unspoken Rules: Sexual Orientation and Women's 
Human Rights 156-58 (Rachel Rosenbloom ed., 1996); Aleksandar Štulhofer, 
Sexuality and Gender in Postcommunist Eastern Europe and Russia 61 (2005). 
98.  Štulhofer, supra note 97. 
99.  Ctr. for Reprod. Law & Policy, Women’s Reproductive Rights in Romania: 
A Shadow Report 14–16 (2000); U.S. Helsinki Watch Comm., supra note 96, at 45. 
100.  Hord, supra note 96, at 232 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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realm beyond the interest of the state.101 Liberal rights such as 
privacy thus found no traction in socialist Romania for women or for 
sexual minorities.102 
After the violent overthrow of the socialist government in 
1989, the laws prohibiting abortion were overturned,103 yet the laws 
criminalizing sodomy were not.104 Following complaints from Council 
of Europe rapporteurs, the Romanian government surrendered to the 
fact that its economic future lay to the West and reviewed its laws 
outlawing homosexuality when it sought Council membership.105 
Responding to European demands that Romania modernize its 
criminal laws, Romanian Justice Minister Petre Ninosu shot back: “If 
we let homosexuals do as they please, it would mean entering Europe 
from behind.”106 Another Romanian politician remarked at the time: 
“[O]f course the EU parliament wants us to abolish Article 200—they 
are all gay.”107 
Just as women’s bodies were seized to play a key role in 
Ceausescu’s nationalistic project, Romanian politicians used a 
homosexualized European body to aid in their own nationalist project 
by resisting repeal of Article 200. The nation took on the form of a 
sexualized body that was threatened with violation from the rear 
when the Council of Europe insisted that it bend to European values. 
We witnessed the same fears expressed by the president of 
Poland in the spring of 2008 when he used the specter of gay 
marriage to trigger national resistance to Poland’s ratification of the 
                                                                                                             
101.  See Gail Kligman, The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction 
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the changes Romania had to make to its Penal Code as a condition to be accepted 
as a member of the Council of Europe). 
106.  Human Rights Watch, supra note 95, at 31–32 (internal quotation 
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107.  Carl F. Stychin, Governing Sexuality: The Changing Politics of 
Citizenship and Law Reform 122 n.7 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2012] Dating the State 27 
new EU constitution. In a nationally televised speech, President Lech 
Kaczynski appealed to threats to Poland’s national values and 
morality if the new constitution were ratified,108 since it included the 
terms of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights—a document 
that includes rights for homosexuals.109 President Kaczynski had his 
staff download a video from the Internet of two men marrying and 
used it as a backdrop to his address to the nation, while patriotic 
Polish music played along.110 The two men, who live in New York and 
had posted the video on the Internet for their friends and family after 
they married in Canada, were outraged when they heard that they 
were being used as a homophobic prop to fortify Polish nationalism.111 
Ultimately Romania repealed Article 200, and in 2007 it was 
admitted to the EU.112 The coupling of a “victory” for gay people in 
Romania with every Romanian’s long term economic interests by 
virtue of membership in the EU teaches us something important 
about the power and limits of using human rights law as the lever 
with which to pry more “backward” nations from their pre-modern 
ways and induct them into modern global citizenship. 
Just as the Council of Europe pressured the Romanian 
government to repeal its laws criminalizing homosexual conduct, the 
Dutch government began funding a Romanian NGO called ACCEPT 
that would work toward the repeal of Article 200.113 ACCEPT defined 
itself explicitly as a human rights organization, not as a local gay and 
lesbian grassroots service provider.114 By formally affiliating with the 
largest federation of lesbian and gay associations in the Netherlands, 
and by receiving funding from the Dutch Foreign Ministry, ACCEPT’s 
main mission was limited exclusively to the repeal of Article 200.115 It 
                                                                                                             
 108.     Address of President Lech Kaczynski (TVP1 television broadcast Apr. 
1, 2008), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cqbHnh7WNpU.  
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PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5380024.stm. 
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vara/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
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did not partner with other human rights campaigns in Romania, such 
as those launched on behalf of the Roma or women, nor did it see 
itself as enabling or responding to a local or indigenous grassroots 
gay or sexual rights movement in Romania. 
Instead, ACCEPT was both responding to and speaking to an 
international audience in Western Europe. Much of the human rights 
script, therefore, was already written—ACCEPT merely had to 
perform it in Romania in a manner that was plausible enough to 
satisfy audiences in Amsterdam and Brussels. 
What do I mean by this script? Here as elsewhere, European 
rapporteurs were not ethnographers prepared to find new forms of 
sexual affiliation that were the unique product of a post-Communist 
Romanian culture. Nor were they prepared to adapt their normative 
tools to respond to those unique conditions. Quite the contrary, 
European rapporteurs went looking for something familiar—a society 
that had homosexuals just like their homosexuals, who were 
discriminated against in predictable ways by public and private 
actors, and who should and could seek legal protection for that 
discrimination from the state. For a state like Romania, serious 
candidacy for admission to the EU meant performing plausible 
modernity by having a recognizable minority of citizens who 
understood themselves to “have” a gay identity just as in the 
European metropole and who could then be recognized by the state as 
rights-bearing subjects. The extent of the state’s obligation with 
respect to these subjects was the annunciation of an anti-
discrimination norm and a minimal infrastructure of enforcement. 
This is what the Dutch paid for when they underwrote the 
activities of ACCEPT, and that is what they got. ACCEPT is an 
organization that did not primarily grow out of Romanian society, but 
instead played an important role as a bridge between the well-
endowed European West and the needy European East. Although the 
EU parliamentarians insisted, in letters to the prime minister of 
Romania, that they were looking forward to welcoming Romania into 
the EU so long as they “share the same values,”116 Romania was able 
to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria simply by repealing Article 200. 
This is the legally formalistic price of admission into the economic 
community of the EU. 
The kind of gay subject these politics call up is one whose 
identity would coagulate in public institutions such as gay pride 
parades and gay community centers, where “gayness” could be 
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isolated and privileged over other kinds of identification grounded in, 
for instance, class, ethnicity, or religion. 
Since 2004, a gay and lesbian pride parade, known as Gay 
Fest, has been held in Bucharest every June.117 The first parade was 
named the Diversity Festival.118 In 2006, Romania was named by 
Human Rights Watch as one of five countries in the world that had 
made “exemplary progress in combating rights abuses based on 
sexual orientation or gender identity.”119 Again, Western Europe got 
what they asked for in Romania—a Western style gay-rights 
movement that demonstrated the kinds of progress that mark a 
society being “civilized” by adherence to regional human rights norms 
as the price of membership in a global community. 
It is impossible to say whether a kind of “gay identity” would 
have emerged in Romania in the absence of the type of interpellation 
that Western European parliamentarians insisted upon as a 
condition of EU membership—calling up recognizable gay subjects 
who could then be protected by human rights laws. Yet the almost 
singular focus on sexual rights as the marker of modernity has been 
accompanied by the neglect of other types of security and rights-based 
values. The “shadow report” prepared by Romanian women’s rights 
NGOs to supplement the report of the Romanian government to the 
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) in 2000 detailed the horrendous treatment of 
women.120 Marital rape remains legal, there are no laws prohibiting 
domestic violence, laws prohibiting sex discrimination in the 
workforce are not enforced, and the maternal mortality rate is among 
the highest in all of Europe due to the fact that unsafe abortions 
remain the primary method of birth control in the absence of 
adequate family planning information and resources.121 More recent 
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reports on the rights of Romanian women, particularly Roma women, 
show little improvement.122 
What is more, Romania has received severe criticism for its 
willingness to allow the United States’ CIA to set up secret detention 
camps and “black sites” in Bucharest where detainees have 
reportedly been subjected to sleep deprivation, slapping, and stress 
positions.123 Perhaps this is the lesson of Romania’s entrance into 
modern Europe: So long as you treat your gay people well, we’ll look 
the other way when it comes to other human rights abuses, or worse, 
ask that you host the export of our own human rights dirty secrets. 
The entrance of Romania into the economic and political 
community of Europe shows us several important things. During 
periods of political transition, sexuality has a curious way of surfacing 
when external threats are homosexualized as a means of solidifying 
or fortifying national identity within. The body of the nation becomes 
sexualized, if not heterosexualized, and a virulent and revitalized 
national heterosexual body stands ready to battle penetration or 
violation from the extraterritorial sexual other. When that 
heterosexualized state later seeks membership in a global political 
and/or economic community, it must revisit its sexual identity in 
ways that satisfy twenty-first century braiding of neo-liberal 
economics and sexual politics. This amounts to what is surely a tricky 
undertaking that involves identity management as part of a larger 
project of global citizenship. The state must convince a global 
audience of a newly found and genuinely felt tolerance toward 
homosexuality, including patriating its gay nationals, while hanging 
on to its own heterosexual reputation. The state’s new homo-
tolerance, some might even call it a kind of “metro-sexuality,” 
becomes a kind of calling-card carried  
by the Finance and Foreign Ministers when they visit Geneva (WTO), 
Washington (IMF, United Nations) and Brussels or Strasbourg 
(European Parliament). 
The Romanian experience shows us how the drive for 
economic inclusion in Western Europe—a drive that was understood 
explicitly by the Europeans as a process of civilizing the Romanians—
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justified the renovation of the heterosexualized body of the nation, 
while conjuring up a homosexualized private citizen. The new gay 
citizens this process produced emerged from a form of identity politics 
that is familiar to late-capitalist societies, but had few roots in post-
communist cultures playing catch up, as was Romania. Identity 
becomes individualized, indeed privatized, along with the economy. 
So too, sexual orientation becomes a private fact about a person that 
should not have public consequences, such as discrimination in 
employment or the ability to serve in the military. Well-written laws, 
adequately enforced, can take care of the problem. Little or no effort 
was made to strengthen the institutions of civil society that might 
check the distributional inequalities of capitalist culture, might balk 
at the conscription of the West’s weaker economic players in the 
United States’ “global war on terror,” and might have sought 
solidarity with other oppressed groups such as the Roma and women. 
Here, as in other contexts, international gay rights NGOs risk being 
used as the front end of the plow that opens up the path for new 
markets for European goods, new low-wage workers, and a much 
weaker social welfare state. 
Certainly these events echo similar European efforts to 
advance forms of economic and human rights-based freedoms in the 
states formerly behind the Soviet Iron Curtain. In these contexts, 
both the cultural intelligibility of a gay citizen/subject and his or her 
rights-bearing status stand as the metonyms of freedom. That is, the 
lack of freedom is most convincingly evidenced by two things: First, 
the absence of a certain percentage of the population who will stand 
up, wave a rainbow flag, and proclaim their authentic homosexual 
identity (“We Are Family,” as the Sister Sledge gay anthem 
declares124); and second, a state that is expected to recognize them by 
and through the enactment of anti-discrimination legislation. An 
international audience is fully prepared to stand in judgment of the 
societies who cannot produce a particular kind of gay citizenry and 
who refuse to extend human rights protections to that citizenry on 
the basis of their identity. 
This formulation of the necessary relationship between 
identity formation, recognition, and rights was concretized in the 
Yogyakarta Principles in 2006 through a set of twenty-eight precepts 
that seek to integrate concerns about sexual orientation and gender 
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identity into the main of human rights law and norms.125 For present 
purposes, Principle 3 is most important, holding that “[e]ach person’s 
self-defined sexual orientation and gender identity is integral to their 
personality and is one of the most basic aspects of self-determination, 
dignity and freedom.”126 Just as Article 15 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights sets out that “[e]veryone has the right 
to a nationality . . . [and] no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
nationality or denied the right to change his nationality,”127 the 
Yogyakarta Principles are animated by a commitment to establish a 
universal and fundamental right to a sexual orientation and gender 
identity.128 This seemingly progressive, inclusive, and dignity-
respecting addition to the inventory of fundamental rights secured by 
international law makes an epistemic claim that risks a kind of 
violence in many contexts outside of the United States, Western 
Europe, and their satellites. It takes as given that all persons do, or 
should, understand themselves to have a sexual orientation and a 
gender identity, and that this sexually-oriented and gendered sense of 
self is fundamental not only to how they know themselves but 
fundamental to who they are. 
A member in good standing in the community of human 
rights-abiding states (in contrast with those that are human rights-
denying) must recognize this universal “fact” of humanity—that 
human bodies everywhere organize and then sort themselves 
according to a sexualized orientation. To deny or question the 
universality of this truth of the human is prima facie evidence of 
bigotry and intolerance. 
IV. PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD COMES TO COLUMBIA 
This brings me back to President Ahmadinejad’s visit to 
Columbia. President Bollinger’s “introduction” of the Iranian leader 
was nothing if not a spectacular display of masculinity. The moment 
seemed to demand the performance of a kind of national manhood. 
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Having called President Ahmadinejad a “petty dictator,” Bollinger 
closed his remarks with a put down, chiding the little man who wore 
no tie for lacking the courage, or even the capacity, to parry the 
thrust of Bollinger’s accusations.129 The occasion required that 
Bollinger get all gender-y, as Eve Sedgwick would have put it.130 
President Ahmadinejad’s comment that “[i]n Iran, we don’t 
have homosexuals like you do in your country,” and that “women in 
Iran enjoy the highest levels of freedom,” offered evidence of what 
some in the United States thought they already knew about Iran and 
its political leadership: It is tyrannical, pre-modern, uncivilized, and 
not to be trusted—not trusted about its knowledge of its own people, 
nor about other issues such as its nuclear ambitions, its role in 
supporting the insurgency in Iraq, or its threat to Israel. While there 
may be some debate among experts about the extent and aims of 
Iran’s nuclear program, no thinking person could doubt the existence 
of homosexuals in Iran and their entitlement to the protection of 
human rights law. 
Or could they? What does it mean that here, as elsewhere, the 
denial of homosexuality and the persecution of sexual deviance are 
used as the ideal cudgel with which international actors could attack 
the Iranians?  
First of all, I hasten to point out that the question of 
homosexuality in Iran is not one obviously amenable to a yes/no 
answer. Of course sexual identification, desires, and identities in Iran 
don’t line up precisely as they do in the United States or in Western 
Europe. Why would they? Again, Joseph Massad has done a more 
than ample job of unpacking this complex issue in the Arab world, 
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and his insights apply with equal force in Iran.131 Afsaneh 
Najmabadi’s and Pardis Madhavi’s works have been equally 
important in exploring the contours of sexual and gender identity in 
modern Iran.132 While I don’t imagine that President Ahmadinejad’s 
claim that there are no homosexuals in Iran was a nuanced reference 
to Massad’s, Najmabadi’s or Mahdavi’s analysis of sexuality in 
Islamic countries, I do think that a thoughtful response to President 
Ahmadinejad’s statement requires sensitivity to the imperial nature 
of the insistence upon the universal, stable, and binary fact of hetero- 
and homosexualities by some of the international human rights 
community. 
Nonetheless, what of the exact words he used in his speech? I 
thought it might be useful to check the translation of his comment 
about gays in Iran. I asked an Iranian colleague, Professor Hamid 
Dabashi, whether the translation we received of the speech was 
accurate. As translated by Professor Dabashi while listening to the 
recording of the event, the exact words the Iranian president used 
were: “[I]n Iran we do not have homosexuals as you do. In our country 
there is no such thing. In Iran such things—in Iran—in Iran—there 
is no such thing. I have no idea who has said this to you.”133 Professor 
Dabashi raised two points about President Ahmadinejad’s word 
choice. First, he focused on the phrase “as you do,” noting that it 
could be “implicitly suggesting that we have a different kind of 
homosexuality in Iran,” or it could mean, “we don’t have them at 
all.”134 Dabashi’s second point is subtler, and muddies the issue far 
more greatly. He wrote to me: 
[N]ow the other issue is that when the second time  
he says “In Iran there is no such thing” the phrase 
that he uses is literally “such a thing has no external 
presence/vojud e khareji nadareh”—now this phrase 
“vojud e khareji nadareh” idiomatically means  
“does not exist” but literally means “has no external 
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existence”—yet another polyvalent phrasing that  
has embedded in it the suggestion that homosexuality 
is not a socially acceptable behavior in Iran,  
namely we do not see it in public space—adding 
credence to the first reading of “as you do” I suggested 
above—namely, again a sympathetic reading of 
Ahmadinejad that in Iran these are private 
matters.135 
Far too many human rights groups, politicians, and media 
outlets outside Iran responded to President Ahmadinejad’s remarks 
with the demand for recognition: “Yes, of course there are gay people 
in Iran!” Even my own colleagues at Columbia Law School’s Sexuality 
and Gender Law Clinic issued a press release immediately after  
the speech expressing outrage at the Iranian president’s denial of  
a gay Iran, at the persecution of lesbian and gay Iranians by  
the government.136 They unfavorably compared that horrendous 
treatment to the favorable constitutional protections that 
homosexuals receive in the United States.137 The press release noted 
that gay Iranians have sought asylum in the United States and 
suggested that this fact was evidence of the greater freedoms here in 
the United States and lesser freedoms there in Iran.138 
LGBT rights advocates found themselves in an unintended 
allegiance with political conservatives in Washington who, despite 
long and vitriolic opposition to positive legal rights for homosexuals 
in the United States, opportunistically used this moment to proclaim 
the moral superiority of the United States compared to the hostile-to-
gays Iranian government. They pointed to the intolerance of Islam 
toward homosexuality as evidence of Iran’s backwardness, while 
failing to mention that all but a few of the organized Christian 
churches in the United States vehemently oppose the rights of gay 
people. 
Immediately after President Ahmadinejad’s speech, media 
outlets and blogs recirculated a horrible picture of two young Iranian 
men being hanged in 2005, ostensibly for being gay.139 At the time of 
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the execution in 2005 there had been a vocal outcry from the 
international human rights community decrying this kind of 
treatment of Iranian gay men.140 Tom Lantos, then a member of the 
U.S. Congress and a Holocaust survivor who had long been an 
adamant supporter of Israel and a critic of Arab states or states 
influenced by Islam, strongly condemned the action: “This sickening 
episode shines a bright light on the severe shortcomings of the 
Iranian legal system. . . . [I]n this case, authorities apparently chose 
to play on deep-seated feelings of bigotry toward homosexuality.”141 
The Belgian Foreign Minister and a British gay rights group 
similarly joined the protest. Peter Tatchell, a British activist, claimed 
“this was just the latest barbarity by the Islamo-fascists in Iran.”142 
It turns out, however, that the young men in this picture were 
very likely prosecuted for sexually assaulting a thirteen-year old boy, 
not for consensual homosexual conduct.143 Reports of their 
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homosexuality had originated with an opposition group in Iran—the 
National Council of Resistance of Iran—knowing full well that the 
international media and human rights community would pick up on it 
immediately as a justification for criticism of the Iranian 
government.144 And they were right. Meanwhile, there were local 
groups in Iran that had galvanized support for the reform of the 
death penalty and criminal laws applying to children through the use 
of the case of the hanging of these two young men.145 This work was 
severely undermined when the international community intervened 
and plucked these two boys out for special treatment because they 
were “gay.”146 
I raise this not to deny that the Iranian government has a 
policy of persecuting men who have sex with men, or women who 
have sex with women, but rather to illustrate how many of the events 
in Iran must be understood in light of how they are inextricably 
intertwined with global politics, in which rights-based claims for 
sexual liberty are used by states as the lever to pry other state 
interests loose. These images, stories, prosecutions, executions, and 
statements are taken up and manipulated in the service of narratives 
of modernity, backwardness, threats to the sovereignty of Iran, 
threats by Iran to the sovereignty of other nations such as Israel or 
Iraq, and internal politics and resistance within Iran itself, as the last 
example clearly illustrates. That the possibly fabricated persecution 
of gay men could be so easily tossed up by the domestic political 
opposition in Iran to an international audience—already poised to 
criticize the Iranian government—should itself give us pause when 
we consider the role of sexuality in struggles for and against global 
citizenship. 
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V. ISRAEL REDUX 
In some respects, the deployment of LGBT rights by states to 
further other national and nationalist interests is nothing new. 
Woodrow Wilson “used” the enfranchisement of women in the United 
States in the immediate post-World War I period as a means by 
which to champion the moral superiority of the United States., The 
U.S. military was racially integrated by Harry Truman after World 
War II for reasons that had as much to do with efforts to distinguish 
the United States from the Soviet Union as with the rightness of 
African American civil rights.147 Likewise, the universalist humanism 
that underlies the post-World War II human rights paradigm always 
risks a kind of biopolitics that should give us pause, whether the 
rights asserted are on behalf of LGBT people in Egypt or Romania, on 
behalf of women undergoing genital cutting in Sudan, against foot 
binding in Japan, or abortion rights in the United States and 
elsewhere.148 
To be honest, I’m happy sitting out the internecine battle 
between the likes of Joseph Massad, on the one hand, and the LGBT 
advocates at Human Rights Watch, on the other, when it comes to the 
impossible goal of getting the descriptive project “right” on the 
question of identity and sexual practices. For present purposes, I 
have a different bone to pick. It has to do with who and what is 
actualized when the LGBT subject is given a voice through the 
intervention of human rights. To what degree should a state’s 
operationalization of sexuality and sexual rights trigger a set of 
ethical concerns back at the home office of the NGOs working to 
advance sex and sexuality-based human rights? When non-state 
actors seek to engage the human rights apparatus in the name of the 
rights and freedom of certain populations and practices, what sort of 
duty do they have to take into account the ways in which the meaning 
and implications of their work may not be of their own making or 
design? 
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Lauren Berlant has urged that we concern ourselves with a 
kind of moral atrophy that sets into some rights-based social 
movements precisely at the moment that the state “takes up” their 
cause.149 Might a kind of atrophy be at risk when the state starts 
doing the heavy lifting related to defending the rights of sexual 
minorities, as we saw in the examples I discussed above? Whether in 
the sodomy reform politics of post-Ceausescu Romania or in today’s 
same sex marriage politics in the United States, there is a risk that 
the rights-bearing gay subject—a new “good citizen”—emerges in the 
foreground of a national landscape while at the same time producing 
at its margin others who are not so good. 
We might laud Israel’s political leadership when it stood up 
for the gays after the Tel Aviv shooting, but we ought to note the 
circumstances when these leaders stood down in the face of similar 
violence perpetrated in more trying circumstances from the 
perspective of the liberal state. Prime Minister Netanyahu came out 
as a defender of gay Israelis when attacks were made against 
innocent young people who had gathered privately in Tel Aviv, but 
not when members of the Israeli religious right attacked radical 
queers who marched in the streets of Jerusalem.150 A “gay right” is 
not a “gay right” is not a “gay right.” The LGBT kids in the 
basement—by no means deserving any form of attack—posed little 
challenge to the liberal state, whereas the queers in the streets just 
might have. Aeyal Gross has posed an even more difficult challenge: 
“Israeli politicians and the GLBT community must ask whether the 
massacre of children in Gaza, and in Sderot, is less shocking that [sic] 
that of children on Nachmani Street in Tel-Aviv [where the Aguda is 
located].”151 
This is all to say that a particular kind of caution is called for 
when the state becomes a partner in the project of converting wrongs 
into rights and outlaws into rights-bearing citizens. As Nietzsche 
observed in the late nineteenth century, liberal or progressive causes 
become significantly less liberal or progressive as soon as they are 
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embraced by the state.152 His conclusion that “there are no worse and 
no more thorough injurers of freedom than liberal institutions,”153 
may press the point further than I would like, yet the idea is one with 
resonance for present purposes. As John D’Emilio taught us in Sexual 
Politics, Sexual Communities,154 the legibility of modern homosexual 
identity has been intimately tied to the interests and needs of the 
liberal state, and in the cases I have discussed here we see evidence 
of how modern liberal states have made good use of their rights-
bearing homosexual citizens. 
Noting the duplicity of the state’s homo-friendliness is not 
enough. Rather the “patriotized” rights-bearing LGBT subject and 
“its” movement have a duty to actively resist being mustered into 
nationalist projects undertaken in its name and purportedly on its 
behalf. 
Once we recognize that the normative homosexuality that 
undergirds human rights discourse is not merely a “fact” in the world, 
but more of a complex value, it becomes easier to see how the state’s 
embrace of the sexual citizenship of these new human rights holders 
risks rendering more vulnerable a range of identities and policies that 
have refused to conform to state-endorsed normative homo- or hetero- 
sexuality. This is true both for queers whose desires refuse to orient 
themselves ineluctably toward marriage, as well as for Muslims with 
sexual norms and practices of polyamory, homosociality, and 
modesty.155 Under this scenario, newly enfranchised gay citizens find 
themselves implicated, whether they want to or not, in the 
construction and identification of the “enemies of the state.” Witness 
the ingenious strategy of StandWithUs and the Israeli Foreign 
Ministry to appeal to gay rights supporters in their efforts to shore up 
Israel’s foreign policy objectives with respect to Palestine and Iran.156 
The challenge of disentangling the state’s agenda from our 
own is enormously difficult, in no small measure due to the degree to 
which the problem is set up by what Foucault called the “incitement 
to discourse.”157 With this he sought to capture the process by which 
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“taking sex ‘into account’”158 transforms it from something understood 
within the grasp of morality (how do we judge it along a continuum of 
sacred to disgusting) to that of reason (how do we make it useful). 
Remarkably, the way he describes the eighteenth century rational 
turn in conceptualizing sexuality applies with equal measure to the 
contemporary examples I offer in this essay: 
[O]ne had to speak of it as of a thing to be not simply 
condemned or tolerated but managed, inserted into 
systems of utility, regulated for the greater good of all, 
made to function according to an optimum. Sex was 
not something one simply judged; it was a thing one 
administered. It was in the nature of a public 
potential.159 
The public potential of sex and sexuality in today’s context has 
materialized in homonationalist policies when states gain political 
power by and through the granting of civil rights to “their” sexual 
minorities. Civil rights, in this regard, not only enable the expansion 
of state power, but also have had the felicitous effect of de-politicizing 
the communities in whose name those rights are mobilized.160 
Does this discussion leave us helpless in the face of a critique 
that eschews both the epistemic violence of securing human rights for 
global gay subjects on the one hand, and state politics as cynical, 
manipulative, instrumental, and tragic on the other? To be sure, this 
is where some find themselves. But we can do better than that. 
Critical awareness of the state’s role as now-fundamental partner in 
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the recognition and protection of a form of sexual rights should push 
us to regard these “victories” as necessarily ethically compromised. 
The moral atrophy that has kept us from recognizing the 
tragedy of these strategies and outcomes is where more critical, and 
indeed discomfiting, work needs to be done by theorists and activists 
alike. This means rethinking the horizon of success. “Victory” in the 
sense of gaining the state as a partner, rather than an adversary, in 
the struggle to recognize and defend LGBT rights ought to set off a 
trip wire that ignites a new set of strategies and politics. This must 
necessarily include a deliberate effort to counteract, if not sabotage, 
the pull of the state to enlist rights-based movements into its larger 
governance projects, accompanied by an affirmative resistance to 
conceptions of citizenship that figure nationality by and through the 
creation of a constitutive other who resides in the state’s and human 
rights’ outside. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I will end with Israel, just as I began this essay, to highlight a 
community that has resisted some of the moral atrophy that often 
accompanies conscription in the state’s larger projects. Some queer 
activists in Israel have parted company with the mainstream of the 
LGBT community, rejecting the terms of the deal made with the 
Israeli government whereby their rights are recognized in exchange 
for being used as a public relations tool.161 The 2010 Tel Aviv gay 
pride parade was held only a few days after the Gaza flotilla raid, and 
the more radical/queer wing of the community chose to hold an 
alternative parade in which they would disidentify queer people with 
the sort of nationalism that the state had been actively cultivating, 
thus reinforcing a kind of anti-nationalist identification.162 Their 
banners read: “There is no Pride in the Occupation.”163 These 
queer/left politics were met with an even greater homonationalization 
of the mainstream Gay Pride Parade, resisting what they termed the 
“occupation” of gay pride by queers who identified with the 
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Palestinians not with Israel.164 Their signs and stickers, donned for 
the main parade, offered a retort to the signs of the anti-nationalists: 
“[N]o to the occupation of the parade,” and “I am a proud Zionist.”165 
In the end, the resistance of some Israeli queers to their cooptation 
into a nationalist project provoked an invigorated re-nationalization 
of the Gay Pride Parade in response, resulting in the proliferation of 
Israeli flags held by parade-goers.166 Nevertheless, this intervention 
introduced and cemented a link between the dangers of Israeli 
nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and homophobia in a way 
that shifted the frame for gay politics in Israel. 
Queer activists in Israel offer an example of a new kind of 
politics that at once appreciates the value of rights and launches new 
strategies to resist the perils of partnership with the state. Having 
said that, it is important to note how narrow the room for this work is 
and how perilous it can be. In February of 2011, I received an e-mail 
from the Office of Cultural Affairs of the Israeli Consulate letting me 
know that the Embassy was sponsoring a U.S. tour of a new 
documentary on the early days of the Israeli gay rights movement. 
“We would love to try and organize a screening and talk with Yair 
[Qedar, the filmmaker] at Columbia University,” the official wrote 
me. Worried that I was being invited to participate in a pinkwashing 
event, I e-mailed my colleague, Aeyal Gross, a law professor at Tel 
Aviv University, and asked whether he knew anything about the 
filmmaker or the film, Gay Days, and whether this was “the usual 
sort of propaganda.” He wrote me back immediately, 
Yair—the director—is a friend and the film is 
certainly not propaganda. I’m sure some will consider 
any depiction of gay rights in [I]srael as such but you 
know that’s not a view I share—we should be able to 
talk of gay rights in [I]srael even if [it] is also co-
opted. . . . . I think that it almost impossible to 
distinguish Israeli government promoting culture 
from the political uses of that, but as I say the film is 
not a propaganda effort—not coming from there at all 
(even if government promotes it for its own purposes). 
The director was involved in [grassroots] activism and 
founded Israeli gay monthly which under his 
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leadership was a voice for queer thought (I used to 
write there regularly) and its dissemination.167 
In Aeyal’s response lies the challenge of activism in the era of 
homonationalist politics. Once the state takes up your cause—for the 
dual purpose of embracing greater rights and of advancing the state’s 
own larger political aims—politics becomes much more complicated in 
tragic ways. Jasbir Puar has termed the tethering of gay rights to 
nationalist projects a kind of “golden handcuffs.”168 
Working on the role of LGBT rights in relation to 
Israel/Palestine is particularly challenging in this regard, given that 
any critique of Israeli state policy (and it is important to reiterate 
that I am talking about state policy, not individual Israelis or Jews) is 
immediately tagged as anti-semitic. What is more, recently enacted 
Israeli law makes careful political engagement with these hard issues 
even more difficult. The “Boycott Bill” passed by the Knesset in July 
of 2011 allows Israeli citizens to bring civil suits against persons and 
organizations that call for economic, cultural, or academic boycotts 
against Israel, Israeli institutions, or regions under Israeli control.169 
It also prevents the government from doing business with companies 
that initiate or comply with such boycotts.170 
I must confess that I have experienced aggressive, sometimes 
violent, reactions to the recent work I have done that expresses 
sympathy for the rights of Palestinians and offers criticisms of Israeli 
state policy. As someone who has often taken unpopular positions in 
the LGBT and feminist communities,171 I thought I was prepared for 
the backlash that engagement with pinkwashing might generate.172 I 
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wasn’t. Both our “golden handcuffs,” to borrow Puar’s term, and the 
chilling effect of the blowback certain political critique now receives, 
has made very crabbed room for politics and intellectual work that 
questions the role sexual civil rights now play in larger nationalist 
projects. 
Queer activists in Israel/Palestine have something to teach us 
about what it means to do politics that resists state occupation. In 
their own ways, on either side of the so-called security “fence” 
(hafrada) or “wall” (jadir), some queers in the region are carving a 
path that neither privileges a global “gay citizen” nor succumbs to 
raw nationalism or racism/anti-semitism. The Palestinian queers I 
have met have a complex analysis of the relationship of occupation to 
homophobia, and refuse to privilege their experience of one over the 
other. They are acutely aware of and their politics respond to the 
ways in which negative social and cultural attitudes toward 
homosexuality in Palestinian culture are shaped in important ways 
by the occupation itself. They resist a politics that elevates a 
particular kind of sexual identity, such as gay or lesbian, over and 
apart from their identity as Palestinian. In this sense, their task has 
been so much more complicated than merely making demands for a 
gay pride parade in al-Manara Square in the center of Ramallah. 
Rather they situate queer politics within a complex web of Israeli 
occupation, nationalist resistance to the occupation, the weakness of 
the Palestinian Authority, the rise of Islamist politics, and a 
Palestinian biopolitical project that figures reproduction and the 
hetero-normative family as vital to national survival. All of these 
dynamics “have had serious consequences for Palestinian queers, not 
because Islam is an inherently (or particularly) ‘homophobic’ religion, 
but because Islamism has ascribed a (negative) ideological value to 
‘homosexuality’ that did not exist before.”173 
So too, radical queer voices in Israel have refused the appeal 
of the new queer nationalism that they have been offered. They insist 
on drawing connections between the radicalism of the settlers’ 
homophobia/sexism and their imperial project in Palestine. The 
creation of social space for out LGBT people in Israel has occurred 
alongside the evacuation of Palestinians from that same territory. 
The one doesn’t necessarily cause the other, but the former has been 
used in the service of the latter. As one Israeli human rights lawyer 
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from Tel Aviv told a group of us on the first LGBTI delegation to 
Israel/Palestine in January 2012, “Tel Aviv may be the most gay city 
in the world, but it’s also the least Arab you’ll find in the Middle 
East.”174 
This is what queering our politics demands: a refusal to take 
up the frames, and the identities those frames call up, which 
“winning” our rights produces. As it also turns out, rights are 
something the state is particularly well-suited to provide, and, as it 
turns out, those very rights end up being quite easily requisitioned by 
the state to advance its own larger interests. It falls on us, those in 
whose name those rights materialize, to resist the seduction of the 
state that, at long last, offers us its embrace, and in return seeks 
collaboration in its own imperial projects. 
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